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Abstract
This paper seeks to explain why Hollywood’s dominant firms are narrowing
the scope of creativity in the contemporary period (1980–2015). The largest
distributors have sought to prevent the art of filmmaking and its related
social relations from becoming financial risks in the pursuit of profit. Major
filmed entertainment, my term for the six largest distributors, must discount
expected future earnings to present prices with the forward-looking logic of
capitalisation; and uncertainty about where creativity in cinema is going can
produce financial uncertainty about the future earning potential of new film
projects. Conversely, a degree of confidence in the expected future earnings
of Hollywood cinema can increase when the art of filmmaking and broader
social world of mass culture are ordered by capitalist power [Nitzan, J. and
Bichler, S., 2009. Capital as power: a study of order and creorder. New
York: Routledge]. For the period of 1980–2015, major filmed entertainment
lowered its risk relative to the period before, 1960–79. This historical process
of risk reduction is the effect of major filmed entertainment making the
wide-release strategy (a.k.a., saturation booking) more predictable through
an aggressive implementation of the blockbuster style and the high concept
standard.
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In 2001, a PBS Frontline documentary analysed the behaviour
of the contemporary Hollywood film business by interviewing
studio executives, film journalists, producers and actors. Titled
‘The Monster That Ate Hollywood’, the documentary wanted
to answer questions such as:
How do today’s Hollywood pictures get made? Who makes the decisions?
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And why are so many big-budget Hollywood movies so disappointing? Have
risk-averse conglomerates squelched Hollywood’s creativity?1
Many of the interviews carried tones of pessimism. In fact, even
the Hollywood ‘insiders’ acknowledged that contemporary Hol-
lywood tended to produce simple, repetitive or unoriginal films.
For example, a studio executive complained how the clichéd
Hollywood-ending was being forced onto stories, regardless of
whether it made any narrative sense (Frontline, 2001).
The PBS documentary also sought to frame Hollywood’s cre-
ative output within the bigger context of global media. For
example, interviewees spoke of how a wave of media conglomer-
ation transformed Hollywood in the 1980s and 1990s. Filmmak-
ing deals were no longer made casually, at parties or over lunch.
Instead, the financial probabilities of film projects were now cal-
culated in boardrooms of people who never began their careers
as filmmakers or producers. Moreover, many of these financial
calculations valued Hollywood films for their strategic positions
in a conglomerated system of multimedia investment. Therefore,
in order to get a ‘green light’ for development and production,
film projects would now need to be much more amenable to the
larger goals of franchising strategies and international consumer
trends.
‘The Monster that Ate Hollywood’ builds a critical perspec-
tive of Hollywood’s behaviour in the film business, but it also
leaves a particular string of questions unanswered:
Why is there a business interest for simpler, repetitive or unoriginal films?
Do capitalists want Hollywood’s creativity to stagnate? Is there a creative
‘recession’ in Hollywood? Would the big studios experiment with more
cinematic styles if it had the ‘right’ creative talent?
1 As of 12 June 2017 the website for ‘The Monster that Ate Hollywood’ is still online.
Interview transcripts and videos can be found at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/hollywood/
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These questions are about the financial goals of Hollywood, but
they are also about the political-economic reasons for Holly-
wood’s creativity, or lack thereof. It appears that the Hollywood
film business is suddenly much less interested in balancing its
pursuit of profit with a desire to make good art. In fact, the
present waves of franchise, blockbuster films suggest that the
Hollywood film industry is no longer distinguishable from the
‘monster’ that purportedly ate it.
This paper seeks to explain why Hollywood’s dominant firms
are narrowing the scope of creativity in the contemporary pe-
riod (1980–2015). Major filmed entertainment – a category
for the six largest business interests in Hollywood distribution:
Columbia, Disney, Paramount, Twentieth Century Fox, Univer-
sal and Warner Bros – attempts to control social creativity such
that the art of filmmaking and its related social relations under
capitalism do not become financial risks in the pursuit of profit.
Social creativity has the potential to translate into a financial
risk because major filmed entertainment must, like other firms,
discount expected future earnings to present prices with the for-
wardlooking logic of capitalisation; and uncertainty about where
creativity in cinema is going can produce financial uncertainty
about the future earning potential of new film projects. Con-
versely, a degree of confidence in the expected future earnings of
Hollywood cinema can increase when the art of filmmaking and
broader social world of mass culture are ordered by capitalist
power (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009). In this cultural environment,
limitations are imposed on what cinema can or cannot do, an
imposition which in turn allows for the financial trajectory of
film projects to become more predictable for those who have a
vested interest in future streams of earnings.
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For the period of 1980–2015 major filmed entertainment low-
ered its risk relative to the period before 1960–79. This historical
process of risk reduction is the effect of major filmed entertain-
ment using its oligopolistic control of film distribution to make
the wide-release strategy (a.k.a., saturation booking) more pre-
dictable. Of course, there is much more to cinema, and even
contemporary Hollywood cinema, than its widest released films.
Yet their theatrical performances have become more predictable
through an aggressive implementation of the blockbuster style
and the high-concept standard. Thus, major filmed entertain-
ment reshaped some of the movements of the cinematic universe
– social relations and all – in order to possess a greater ability
to affirm, modify or deny film projects and ideas according to
their perceived roles in capital accumulation.
This paper is composed of five sections. The first section
explains how I group the financial data of Hollywood’s major
distributors into one category, major filmed entertainment. The
next two sections outline how I am using the capital-as-power
approach to define and analyse major filmed entertainment’s risk
reduction. I explain my use of the concepts of capitalisation and
risk in the capital-aspower approach, as well as the concept of
differential accumulation, Nitzan and Bichler’s concept of how
capitalised power is understood relatively. The end of the third
section demonstrates why the analysis of differential risk reduc-
tion is particularly relevant to the political-economic study of
the Hollywood film business. Following the sections that outline
my methods of research, the fourth section presents my findings
on the role of blockbuster cinema and high-concept filmmaking
in major filmed entertainment’s push to reduce risk. The fifth
section uses theatrical revenues, opening theatre distributions
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and operating income data to demonstrate that major filmed
entertainment has been able to increase its degree of confidence
in the saturation-booking strategy.
In sections four and five, the reader will notice that many
of the figures focus on the US market. This paper is not ne-
glecting the international dimension of Hollywood out of igno-
rance. Rather, the arguments and the methods of this paper
rely on longer historical time series and many of the available
time series on theatrical revenues, ticket prices and attendance
are US-based. International market data do exist, but either
in forms that are too aggregated for this paper’s purpose (e.g.
total international revenues) or as fragmented pieces (e.g. for-
eign revenues of single or select films). The next step beyond
this paper would involve developing quantitative analyses about
the capitalised power of a global Hollywood. Such a step would
create a scope of research that could organically incorporate re-
search that focuses on the global influence of Hollywood cinema
(Crane, 2014; Jin, 2011; Miller, Govil, McMurria, Maxwell, &
Wang, 2005; Trumpbour, 2002). Of particular importance to
future research would be to develop datasets to determine the
influence of international theatrical markets on the production,
distribution and marketing strategies of Hollywood. Contempo-
rary research demonstrates that film executives consciously ac-
count for foreign markets when they assess the story and casting
decisions of proposed film projects (Mingant, 2015); and perhaps
these executives are beginning to give more weight to the risk of
failure in foreign markets. Yet a more concrete argument about
what the capital-as-power approach could say on this issue is
outside the scope of this paper.
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Major filmed Entertainment
This section explains how I gathered and organised my financial
data on the major Hollywood distributors. As a way to speak
about their oligopolistic effects, I use the term major filmed en-
tertainment. As Table 1 shows, this category comprises the six
major studios in Hollywood: Twentieth Century Fox, Columbia,
Disney, Paramount, Universal and Warner Bros. These studios
were key players in the studio era of Hollywood, and they dom-
inated film distribution for the years I am primarily researching
(1950–2015).
I have chosen to use ‘major filmed entertainment’ over other,
more commonly used terms, such as ‘major film studios’ and
‘Hollywood film distribution’, for two reasons. First, ‘major
filmed entertainment’ is a language marker that helps remind
the reader of the political-economic assumptions that frame my
empirical research on Hollywood’s behaviour and performance.
Some of the facts and data have been drawn from other sources
in film studies and political economy, but I do not want my
terminology to imply that there is an automatic agreement over
the theoretical meaning of the data.
Second, ‘filmed entertainment’ is a term that signifies the
scale of the available financial data from 1950 to 2015. The busi-
ness of cinema has, in the last few decades, diversified its meth-
ods of gaining income – e.g. exhibition windows after theatri-
cal exhibition (DVD, Blu-Ray, Internet streaming), intellectual
property, franchising – and there are serious obstacles involved
in trying to isolate the business of cinema in this age of con-
glomeration. At one end of the scale, we must still distinguish
filmed entertainment operations from the different activities of
Hollywood’s corporate parents. For example, GE acquired NBC
6
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Table 1: Major Filmed Entertainment
Studioa Parentb Financial Data (Source)
Columbia Coca-Cola (1982–7); 1950–81 (COMPUSTAT)c;
Sony (1989–2015) 1995–2015 (Annual Reports)
Disney 1993–2015 (Annual Reports)
Paramount Gulf + Western (1966–89); 1950–55, 1957-94 (COMPUSTAT);
Paramount Communications (1989–94) 1995–2015 (Annual Reports)
Viacom (1995–2015)
Twentieth Century Fox News Corporation (1985–2012); 1951–80, 1982-92 (COMPUSTAT);
Twenty-First Century Fox (2013–15) 1996–2015 (Annual Reports)
Warner Bros. Warner Bros.-Seven Arts (1967–69); 1965–66, 1972-88 (COMPUSTAT);
Kinney National Company (1969–71); 1994–2015 (Annual Reports)
Warner Communications (1972–89);
Time Warner (1990–2015)
Universal MCA (1964–89); 1954–89 (COMPUSTAT)
Matsushita (1990–95);
Seagram Inc. (1995–2000);
Vivendi (2000–11);
GE (2004–12);
Comcast (2009–15)
a For histories of the Hollywood film business and profiles of the major studios after the Paramount case of 1948,
see Cook (2000); Langford (2010); Maltby (2003); Prince (2000); Wasko (1994, 2003).
b For details on the conglomeration and ownership structure of Hollywood, see Bagdikian (2004); Compaine and
Gomery (2000); Kunz (2007); Thomas and Nain (2004).
c COMPUSTAT was accessed through Wharton Research Data Services.
d The relevant annual reports were accessed through company websites, the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission EDGAR database and the New York Stock Exchange.
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Universal from Vivendi in the early 2000s. For the period when
GE had a full or partial stake in media entertainment (Comcast
had a 51 per cent stake in NBC Universal from 2009 to 2013),
this giant of corporate America was also investing in the busi-
ness of appliances, aviation, gas, industrial motors, weapons and
wind turbines, among others. Consequently, the market capital-
isation or net income of GE, the conglomerate firm, gives us far
too much noise for our purposes. At the other end of the scale,
data for the film studios proper are not always available. ‘Filmed
entertainment’ signifies that some of the data will sometimes in-
clude other filmed operations, like television or animation.
Others are also concerned about the difficulties in researching
the financial aspects of Hollywood (Leaver, 2010; Wasko, 2003).
As a consequence of these limitations, my empirical methods
aim to be multi-sided. At the centre of my analysis is a dataset
that has accounted for the state of businesssector data in the
era of conglomeration (Kunz, 2007; Prince, 2000). As is shown
in the third column of Table 1, the source of data changes from
COMPUSTAT to annual reports in the early 1990s. This change
is made at each point when financial data on the studios are
superseded by financial data on the parent conglomerate, as a
whole entity. Rather than continue the series with data on the
conglomerate parents – which repeats the problem of the GE
example above – I have used the conglomerates’ annual reports
to extract data on each of their filmed entertainment business
operations. The advantage of this method is that we can ignore
the conglomerates’ operations that are not relevant to specific
arguments about Hollywood cinema. The disadvantage, how-
ever, is that our market capitalisation data end when we switch
from COMPUSTAT to annual reports.
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Capitalisation and Risk
Older volumes of New Political Economy include articles that
have used the capital-as-power approach to study income in-
equality, food prices and the ownership of public debt in the
United States. These respective studies by Brennan (2013),
Baines (2014), and Hager (2014), as well as those of others
(Cochrane, 2011; Park & Doucette, 2016; Suhail & Phillips,
2012), use Nitzan and Bichler’s theorisation of capitalisation
to understand capital accumulation as a forward-looking power
process. Capitalisation, according to Nitzan and Bichler, is
the ‘mechanism through which capitalist power is commodified,
structured and restructured’ (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009, p. 18). As
a quantitative, symbolic expression of future expectations, cap-
italisation also represents ‘neither the productivity of the owned
artifacts, nor the abstract labour necessary to produce them, but
the power of a corporation’s owners’ (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009,
p. 8, emphasis in original). In the case of studying the power
processes of major filmed entertainment, Nitzan and Bichler’s
conceptualisation of risk has been particularly useful (McMa-
hon, 2013, 2015). Risk is an ‘elementary particle’ of capitalisa-
tion. Risk is the degree of confidence (inverted) that capitalists
have in their discounting of future earnings to present prices (of
Hollywood cinema, in this case).
The other ‘elementary particles’ of capitalisation are earn-
ings, hype and the normal rate of return, which, like a treasury
bill or a government bond yield, is a rate of return that ‘all
capitalists believe they deserve’ at minimum (Nitzan & Bichler,
2009, p. 239).2 The relationship between these four variables
2 The normal rate of return can fluctuate, but, according to Nitzan and Bichler, this
rate is perceived as ‘normal’ because state power has made this a universal condition of
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can be presented this way:
Kt =
E ×H
δ × rc (1)
Capitalisation at any given time (Kt) is equal to the discounted
value of future earnings (E) multiplied by hype (H), which
measures the extent to which capitalists are ‘overly optimistic
or overly pessimistic about future earnings’ (Nitzan & Bichler,
2009, p. 189). The numerator is discounted by two variables: a
rate of return that capitalists feel they can confidently get (rc)
and the risk coefficient (δ). Because risk is in the denominator,
a smaller δ indicates a greater degree of confidence and there-
fore a larger capitalisation, and a larger δ indicates the opposite.
If, for instance, there is growing uncertainty about the size and
pattern of a future stream of earnings, δ will increase and the
asset in question will be discounted to a lower present price.3
In the context of accumulating capital from cinema, risk
measures the degree of confidence investors have in future re-
lationships between accumulation strategies, filmmaking strate-
gies and their financial consequences (McMahon, 2013, 2015).
Furthermore, since risk perceptions are a major component of
capitalisation, reducing risk is a major driver of accumulation.
This reduction is accomplished by making the articulation and
determination of the world of cinema ever more predictable.
The future is, of course, always unknown. Yet major filmed
entertainment, like other business enterprises, translates its con-
business – e.g. government bonds guarantee a return that capitalists can then seek to beat
through private investment. In fact, the normal rate of return is a foundation for strategic
sabotage: if your firm cannot make a ‘reasonable profit’ – i.e. something as least as high as
the ‘normal’ rate – limit production or shut down. For more on the power underpinnings
of the normal rate of return, see (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009, p. 243-48).
3 For an expanded version of this explanation, see McMahon (2013); Nitzan and Bichler
(2009).
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trol of industry and the historical trajectories of society into
forecasted instrumental calculations about its claims of owner-
ship. If we break down the overall confidence of major filmed
entertainment into smaller building blocks of means and ends,
we acquire a keener sense of how strategic questions about the
control of social creativity will underpin the capitalisation of
cinema. For example: which film projects should be nurtured,
developed and then green lit for production? Which film ideas
should be rejected, and according to what criteria? Should cre-
ativity in filmmaking obey standards about form and content,
and, if so, what should these standards be and how should they
be instituted? What will happen to earnings if filmmakers are
allowed to explore new ideas or experiment with untested film-
making techniques? Will consumers welcome – i.e. pay for –
forms of cinema that engage with social taboos or controversial
subjects? What about political films? Overall, will people pay
to watch what we decide to make? Can we make them pay –
and if so, how?
In the contemporary era of the Hollywood film business, these
and other questions about the artistic trends of filmmaking re-
late to the risk of overproduction. Figure 1 helps explain why.
Panel A presents the yearly total of all films released in Amer-
ica, as well as a series that counts the number of films released
by major filmed entertainment. The series in Panel B measures
US yearly theatrical attendance per capita. After a sharp de-
cline that was most likely caused by the advent of television,
US attendance per capita has stayed at roughly the same level
since the 1960s. Thus, the juxtaposition of Panels A and B il-
lustrates how reducing the risk of overproduction would be a
top priority if, from 1980 onwards, more and more movies are
11
McMahon New Political Economy (Preprint)
technically available, but in practice the average American is
still only seeing about four or five films in theatres per year.
Moreover, the contemporary problem for major filmed enter-
tainment might be to determine which four or five films the
average moviegoer sees; and more specifically, to create a deter-
minable order of cinema that keeps the spotlight directly on its
own films. Hollywood may certainly try to expand the market,
pushing people to see more films in theatres, but the data on
US attendance per capita can explain why major filmed enter-
tainment is attempting to redistribute attendance upwards, to
their own blockbusters (Cucco, 2009).
Differential Accumulation and the Study of Dif-
ferential Risk
Differential accumulation is rooted in the relative differences
between magnitudes of capitalisation (Nitzan, 2001; Nitzan &
Bichler, 2009). For example, on 16 January 2015, Apple’s mar-
ket capitalisation ($622.8 billion) was 1.6 times larger than Google’s
($383.8 billion), and Google’s was 2.3 times larger than Disney’s
($160 billion). Taken at a single point in time, these multiples
are static measures of differential capitalisation. Differential
accumulation measures how differential capitalisation changes
over time. Firms accumulate differentially when their capital-
isation rises faster than that of others and ‘their distributive
share’ becomes ‘bigger and bigger’ (Nitzan, 2001, p. 230).
Similarly to how capitalisation can be broken down into ele-
mentary particles, differential accumulation can be broken down
into the elements of differential capitalisation (Nitzan & Bichler,
12
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Figure 1: Theatrical releases in the US and theatrical attendance
per capita
Note: For 1943–59, attendance per capita = (total box-office receipts/average
ticket price)/US population.
Sources: (Finler, 2003, p. 376–7) for box-office receipts from 1943 to 1959;
‘Appendix: A Hollywood Timeline, 1960–2004,’ in (Bordwell, 2006, p. 191–242)
for total attendance 1960–2004; http://natoonline.org/data/admissions/
for attendance 2005– 12. Global Insight for total United States population.
(Finler, 2003, p. 376-7) for total US releases from 1933 to 2002; MPAA
Theatrical Market Statistics for total US releases from 2003 to 2015.
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2009, p. 327):
DK =
Ka
Kb
=
Ea
Eb
× HaHb
δa
δb
(2)
Like Equation 1, Equation 2 deconstructs capitalisation into fu-
ture earnings, hype and risk. The normal rate of return is effec-
tively cancelled out because it is common to the capitalisation
of both the entity in question (a) and the benchmark to which
it is compared (b).4 By making each element the ratio of two
entities, Equation 2 shows us how the capitalisation of a can rise
faster than the through a rise in differential profit (E˙a > E˙b), a
rise in differential hype (H˙a > H˙b) or a decrease in differential
risk (δ˙a < δ˙b).
To investigate how major Hollywood firms can differentially
accumulate through a decrease in differential risk, this paper
places major filmed entertainment in the numerator (δa) and
dominant capital as a whole in the denominator (δb). Domi-
nant capital is defined, for each year, as the top 500 firms on
COMPUSTAT, sorted by the market capitalisation of all firms
that are listed, but not necessarily incorporated, in the United
States. This 500-firm index of dominant capital is meant to be
similar to the S&P 500, which is a standard benchmark for the
performance of large US-based corporations.
Conducting political-economic research on a differential mea-
sure of risk lets us inquire how a firm or group of firms, like major
filmed entertainment, lowers its risk at a faster rate than others.
In fact, the relationship between risk reduction and Hollywood’s
efforts to differentially accumulate is an important research topic
for two reasons.
4 The entities a and b do not necessarily have to be single firms; they can be the total
or average capitalization of a set of firms.
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First, major filmed entertainment’s differential profits can-
not explain the surge in differential capitalisation from 1980 to
1994. The darker line in Figure 2 plots the differential mar-
ket capitalisation of major filmed entertainment from 1950 to
1994. Here, the average market capitalisation of major filmed
entertainment is benchmarked against the average for dominant
capital as a whole. As was mentioned when we first introduced
the term ‘major filmed entertainment’, the capitalisation data
for this group end at 1994 (from this point onward, available
data pertain to the market capitalisation of Hollywood’s parent
conglomerates, rather than the subsidiaries we are interested in).
The other series in Figure 2 measures the differential operating
income of major filmed entertainment, which is likewise bench-
marked against dominant capital. Unlike market capitalisation,
this series is available for the entire 1950–2015 period. Overall,
Figure 2 demonstrates that, for the years for which there are
data for both series, the differential earnings of major filmed
entertainment are insufficient to explain its differential capital-
isation. Most significantly, differential earnings declined from
1980 to 1994, while differential capitalisation soared. Although
there can be no comparison made for years subsequent to 1994,
it is clear that differential capitalisation depends not only on
earnings, but also – and possibly far more so – on differential
risk.
Second, risk reduction is a corollary of the tricky relation-
ship between major filmed entertainment’s distribution strate-
gies and its broader social effects. In particular, this group of
firms often stagnates its output and is involved (with film ex-
hibitors) in the inflation of ticket prices. Yet as stagnation of
output and inflation of pries occur, major filmed entertainment
15
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Figure 2: Differential capitalisation and differential operating
income of major filmed entertainment
Note: Both series are 5-year trailing averages. See Table 1 for details to
explain why differential capitalisation ends at 1993.
Sources: COMPUSTAT through WRDS for common shares outstanding (CSHO)
and Price (PRCC_F) of Major Filmed Entertainment, 1950–93. COMPUSTAT
through WRDS for operating income, common shares outstanding (CSHO) and
Price (PRCC_F) of Dominant Capital 500, 1950–93. Annual reports of Disney,
News Corp, Viacom, Sony, Time Warner (Management’s Discussion of Business
Operations for information on their filmed entertainment interests) for operating
income of Major Filmed Entertainment, 1993–2015.
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also depends on the habitual return of audiences for the newest
output, especially for summer and holiday blockbusters. From
the theoretical perspective of the capital-as-power approach,
major filmed entertainment’s behaviour would be categorised as
a depth strategy (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009). As one of the general
means of differential accumulation, the strategies of depth in-
volve stagflation (stagnant growth + inflation) and cost cutting.
Firms are not eternally bound to use depth strategies. Another
type of strategy is accumulation through breadth, which seeks to
increase the organisational size of a firm and involves green-field
investment and mergers and acquisitions Bichler and Nitzan
(2013); Francis (2013); Nitzan and Bichler (2009). In contrast
to breadth, accumulation through depth can put a greater stress
on capitalism’s social hierarchies and inequalities: a firm might
attempt to sell a commodity with a bigger markup; a firm might
try to depress industrial production below its technological ca-
pacity to meet social needs; a firm might cut wages or lay off a
part of its workforce. These strategies are all contentious and
conflictual, making differential accumulation through depth a
‘seemingly far more risky [strategy] than breadth’ (Nitzan &
Bichler, 2009, p. 19).
The goal of accumulation through depth is to increase the
elemental power per ‘unit of organisation’ – e.g. increase earn-
ings per employee (Nitzan and Bichler 2009). In Hollywood’s
case, its strategy to accumulate through depth involves increas-
ing earnings per film during periods when the rate of film re-
leases is stagnating or even decreasing. Moreover, earnings per
film is a representation of the elemental power that Hollywood
has over the consumer, who may or may not consume from a
smaller pool of films or who may or may not pay higher ticket
17
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prices. For added clarity, the place of earnings per film in the
overall earnings of major filmed entertainment can be presented
algebraically:
MFEe =
earnings
films
× films = earningsperfilm × films (3)
As Equation 3 helps us see, a decrease in the number of films is
not automatically trouble for major filmed entertainment. By
increasing earnings at a rate higher than the rate of decrease in
the number of films earnings per film can fuel a successful depth
strategy.
Figure 3 estimates the relationship between major filmed en-
tertainment’s differential profits and its use of the depth strat-
egy. Panel A of Figure 3 measures the average differential op-
erating income of major filmed entertainment (relative to domi-
nant capital as a whole). Panel B shows the rates of changes of
two series: major filmed entertainment’s annual film releases and
the mean ‘real’ US ticket price (avg. US ticket price/US CPI).
The shaded areas cover periods when either the mean ‘real’ US
ticket price inflated consecutively, for a minimum of three years,
or when the per cent change of film releases was negative, con-
secutively for a minimum of three years. The darker grey bars
indicate when these two processes occurred simultaneously (i.e.
stagnation + inflation).
In the midst of its depth strategy, major filmed entertain-
ment relies on the stability of the social relations that underpin
its confidence (Bichler & Nitzan, 2010; Kliman, 2011). Oth-
erwise, stagnant output and rising ticket prices can engender
consumer frustration. A limited number of films, for instance,
might not be sufficient to satisfy the desires and habits of movie-
goers; or the quality of Hollywood films might not be ‘worth it’
18
McMahon New Political Economy (Preprint)
Figure 3: Differential profits and major filmed entertainment’s
depth strategy
Note: Differential profit in Panel A is a 5-year trailing average. Both se-
ries in Panel B are per cent changes from 5-year trailing averages.
Sources: COMPUSTAT through WRDS for operating income of Major Filmed
Entertainment, 1950–92. Annual reports of Disney, News Corp, Viacom, Sony,
Time Warner (Management’s Discussion of Business Operations for information
on their filmed entertainment interests) for operating income of Major Filmed
Entertainment, 1993–2013. (Finler, 2003, p. 376–7) for total US releases from
1933 to 2002; MPAA Theatrical Market Statistics for total US releases from
2003 to 2015. Box-Office Mojo (boxofficemojo.com/about/adjuster.htm) and
NATO Online (natoonline.org/data/ticket-price/) for US ticket prices,
1960–2015.
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when ticket prices inflate. Thus, it is always possible that con-
sumers will see even fewer films in the future, or that they will
become tired of Hollywood concentrating on blockbuster cinema
at the expense of so many other possibilities in filmmaking. Like
Machiavelli’s (1999) prince, major filmed entertainment must
pursue its own particular goals, but without losing the hearts
and minds of its ‘people’.
Making Saturation Booking More Predictable
This section analyses some of the key details behind major filmed
entertainment’s systematic reduction of its risk, both absolutely
and differentially. From 1980 to 2015, major filmed entertain-
ment has been successful at increasing the predictability of its
theatrical revenues, which are still good predictors to how films
perform later, when they are no longer in theatres and dis-
tributed on other platforms (Elberse, 2013, p. 25). To be sure,
higher levels of operating profits would be desirable as well – as-
suming that volatility does not increase – but the distribution of
blockbuster-type films for large theatrical openings has at least
given major filmed entertainment a greater degree of confidence.
As will be shown, major filmed entertainment has been using,
from the early 1980s to 2015, the blockbuster style and the high-
concept standard to develop a ‘saturation-booking’ strategy that
more consistently outperformed films that were released in fewer
theatres.
Saturation booking is the distribution strategy to give some
films wide theatrical openings in multiple markets. Saturation
booking starts on opening day, continues on opening weekend
and remains in place for as long as a film is popular in cities and
20
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towns all over the country. This is a well-known strategy of con-
temporary Hollywood, but the risk perceptions of major filmed
entertainment relate to its successful application. For instance,
Hollywood must decide how many big-budget films it will pro-
duce or finance – all in the hopes that each one will become a
hit at the box office. Moreover, executives, managers and pro-
ducers must, in the interest of future income, ask questions that
underpin the capitalisation of film projects. For instance, what
type of film can reach the highest revenues plateau? Does it
matter if a film opens in ten theatres, 100 theatres or 1,000?
Which stories or ideas will get big production budgets? Which
film projects should go to blockbuster levels and open in more
than 3,000 theatres? Because there is not 100 per cent certainty
about the future behaviour of moviegoers, these questions all re-
late to risk management. Furthermore, a wide-release strategy
is not simply designed to accumulate big revenues; it is designed
to accumulate them as quickly as possible (Elberse, 2013).
The following analyses of blockbusters and high concept are
analytically separated, even if they are complementary in real
life (the blockbuster film is often high concept and vice versa).
This separation allows us to see that a lower risk saturation-
booking strategy is a historical development. The latest wave of
franchise cinema, for example, is an even stronger push to make
wide-release distribution even more predictable.
The Blockbuster Effect
Blockbuster cinema, which first emerged in the 1970s, is differ-
ent from ‘event’ films of the past. Hollywood films before the
1970s, no matter how big in production value and grand in scale
or imagination, did not get wide releases through simultaneous
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exhibition – saturation booking was only used for exploitation
and pornographic films. Instead, a pre-1970 Hollywood film
moved through a tiered system that staggered the exhibition
schedule. ‘First-run’ theatres – movie theatres in metropolitan
centres – would get the film first.5 Only when the ‘first-run’ was
complete would the film move on to the second tier, and so on
down the line. The actor and director Tom Laughlin broke this
convention in 1971. By using the saturation-booking method
for his own Hollywood film, Billy Jack, Laughlin helped usher
out the classical system of exhibition, which still carried on after
the 1948 Supreme Court decision forced major filmed entertain-
ment to divest its movie-theatre holdings (Litman, 1998; Schatz,
2008).
The relevance of blockbuster cinema to the risk perceptions
of saturation booking can be understood dialectically: a more
effective use of the saturation-booking strategy was an eventual
solution to the early shortcomings of saturation booking in the
1970s.6 Look beyond the two most obvious financial successes
of the 1970s – Jaws and Star Wars – and there are examples
5 While a tiered system was certainly in place, ‘first-run’ theatres lost some of their
advantages after 1948. For example, there was no longer a ticket-price difference between
‘first-run’ theatres and lower tiered ones – most likely due to the post-1948 decline of
double features (i.e. tickets that count for two back-to-back films). Also, the ‘clearance’
tactic – where major studios would remove a film from all theatres for a block of time
between its ‘first-run’ exhibition and its ‘second-run’ – was deemed illegal in the Supreme
Court case against Paramount and the other major studios (Waterman, 2005, p. 57).
6 “Spirit gains its truth only through finding itself within absolute rupture. Spirit
is that power not as a positive which turns away from the negative, as when we say of
something that it is nothing or false, and having thus finished with it we turn to something
else; rather, spirit is that power only in so far as it looks the negative in the face and dwells
in it. This dwelling is the magic force which converts the negative into being.” (Hegel,
2005, p. 129) Yirmiyahu Yovel, in his running commentary on Hegel’s ‘Preface’ to the
Phenomenology, describes the self-reflective nature of Reason: “It is essential for knowledge
to separate itself from the object and thus introduce falsity as a condition of the eventual
reidentification.” (Hegel, 2005, p. 141)
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of this decade having qualities that undermined the interests
of major filmed entertainment. First, if blockbusters were to
be high-octane fuel for the big engine of saturation booking,
major filmed entertainment would need to learn how to design
enough ‘must-see’ films for the top financial tier. This lesson
was first taught in 1976, the year that was sandwiched between
Jaws and Star Wars. Jaws created a new pecuniary standard for
high-grossing films, and in this environment, the great financial
success of Rocky – the highest grossing film in 1976 – was, as
Cook describes, ‘puzzling and unnerving’ (2000, p. 52). Rocky
was a low-budget project that featured, at the time, a cast of
unknown actors. Its unexpected success twisted the knife in
the side of designed-to-be-blockbuster films such as King Kong
(1976) and The Deep (1977), two films that could not repeat the
financial success of Jaws (Cook, 2000, p. 44).
Second, if the blockbuster style was going to be a mainstay
for years to come, major filmed entertainment needed the ‘right’
type of creativity. Two young directors at the time, Steven Spiel-
berg and George Lucas, were certainly proving their worth early
on, but many of their contemporaries in the late 1970s were mak-
ing auteur/blockbuster hybrids that proved to be incompatible
with the wide-release strategy. On the one hand, the produc-
tion costs of films such as Kubrick’s Barry Lyndon, Peckinpah’s
Convoy, Friedkin’s Sorcerer, Coppola’s Apocalypse Now, Scors-
ese’s New York, New York and Cimino’s Heaven’s Gate were
far too big for a small-release strategy to be profitable; on the
other hand, the form and content of these films were also too
esoteric to ever reach the revenues plateau of a Jaws or a Star
Wars (Bach, 1985; Cook, 2000; Wyatt, 1994).
Figure 4 helps illustrate the transformation from the 1970s to
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the current era of Hollywood cinema, 1980–2015. The figure is a
proxy for the consumer habits of American cinema. It presents
the volatility of attendance for both the top three and top five
films per year. Volatility is computed in two steps. For both
the top three and the top five films per year, total attendance in
persons were converted to their annual growth rates, from the
1940s to 2015. The series shown in Figure 4 are the result of the
second step. They are 20-year rolling standard deviations of the
computed annual growth rates in theatrical attendance. In other
words, each point in the standard-deviation series calculates the
spread of change for the previous 20 years of theatrical atten-
dance. The larger the standard deviation, the higher volatility
the rate of change of attendance.
Interestingly, the volatility of attendance in the 1970s, the
first decade of blockbuster cinema, was similar to that of the
1960s and even the mid-1950s – two periods when saturation
booking was not yet a Hollywood strategy. Thus, we can surmise
that, even if the release of Jaws in 1975 was the first big success
of saturation booking, the related degree of confidence had not
yet begun to increase. To be sure, having single-handedly pulled
in around 128 million attendances in the United States, Jaws was
an example to be mimicked immediately. Justin Wyatt describes
the saturation-booking strategy that followed on its heels:
Following Jaws, high quality studio films developed
even broader saturation releases; in 1976, King Kong
(with a 961 theater opening); in 1977, The Heretic:
Exorcist II (703 theaters), The Deep (800 theaters),
Saturday Night Fever (726 theaters); in 1978, Grease
(902 theaters) and Star Trek – The Motion Picture
(856 theaters) continued to expand the pattern of sat-
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Figure 4: Volatility of US theatrical attendance: top three and top
five films
Notes: Attendance = Total US gross revenues of the top three films/average US
ticket price. Each series is a 20-year trailing standard deviation of annual per
cent rates of changes (e.g. 1980 = standard deviation of the rates of changes
from 1961 to 1980)
Sources: Source: Bradley Schauer and David Bordwell, ‘Appendix: A Hollywood
Timeline, 1960–2004,’ (Bordwell, 2006, p. 191–242). For years not covered in
Schauer and Bordwell, see www.boxofficemojo.com for yearly gross revenues
of individual films and National Association of Theatre Owners for average US
ticket price (http://natoonline.org/data/ticketprice/)
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uration release and intense television advertising. (Wy-
att, 1994, p. 112)
Despite this flurry of wide releases, however, Figure 4 illustrates
that there is still a difference between the 1970s – a decade when
blockbuster cinema was still in its infancy – and the contempo-
rary period from 1980 to the present – a time when blockbuster
cinema has become Hollywood’s predominant style. The two se-
ries – ‘Top 3’ and ‘Top 5’ – both start their decline in the 1980s
and reach their lowest levels in the 2000s. For example, the 20-
year standard deviation for the attendance growth rate of the
top three films in 2011 was 48 per cent smaller than the standard
deviation in 1980. The significance of the spike in volatility in
2015 will be analysed in a future paper.
The High-concept Standard
Over the past three decades, major filmed entertainment’s grow-
ing preference for high-concept films went hand in hand with
its search for films that would likely succeed as wide releases.
High-concept cinema in Hollywood involves the simplification
of a film’s message for marketing purposes. This strategy first
emerged in the late 1970s, when the project of ‘New’ Hollywood
waned (Berliner, 2011; Kirshner, 2012; Wyatt, 1994). At times,
the socially charged films of New Hollywood could become pop-
ular box-office hits, but the volatilities of their revenues and
operating profits were also high. By excising the complexity,
ambiguity and, dare we say, politics from the aesthetic inten-
tions of New Hollywood, the application of high-concept cinema
was a way for major filmed entertainment to realign the aesthet-
ics of its films with the contemporary strategies of saturation
booking and blockbuster cinema.
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‘High concept’ is simultaneously an aesthetic and business
term. It refers to a style of filmmaking that assumes that the
essence of a film is broadly marketable when its main idea is
as simple and straightforward as possible (Wyatt, 1994). Ac-
cording to the logic of high concept, the idea of a film should
be communicated easily, as a modern audience is likely to dis-
cover upcoming films through trailers and other advertisements.
Thus, because of its aesthetic design, short descriptions ade-
quately represent what high-concept films are about. (It may
already appear that ‘low concept’ is a more appropriate term;
however, ‘high concept’ is the term used by the film business.)
Who exactly invented high concept has yet to be settled.
Justin Wyatt notes that some people credit Barry Diller, while
others point to Michael Eisner. Diller first used the high-concept
standard when he was a programming executive for ABC televi-
sion. He ‘approved those projects which could be sold in a single
sentence’ (Wyatt, 1994, p. 8). Eisner first practised high con-
cept when he was a creative executive for Paramount (he later
moved to Disney). For Eisner, it was also about whether a film
could be summarised briefly (Wyatt, 1994, p. 8). Regardless of
its exact origin, high concept became a standard in Hollywood
‘pitch’ meetings, which usually give writers or filmmakers only
about 20 minutes to sell their idea or script to a producer or
development executive (Elsbach & Kramer, 2003, p. 286). For
example, Steven Spielberg, the most financially successful direc-
tor in contemporary Hollywood and an executive producer of
many films, uses the high-concept style to bridge pitched ideas
and their hypothetical final products, the films themselves: ‘If
a person can tell me the idea in 25 words or less, it’s going to
make a pretty good movie. I like ideas, especially movie ideas,
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that you can hold in your hand’ (quoted in Wyatt, 1994, p. 13).
In a high-concept film, one will find character types, a simple
narrative or a take-away image or style – and sometimes all
three of these elements. As Wyatt observes, the elements of
high-concept cinema come together such that they weaken our
identification with character and narrative. Instead of building
a complicated relationship between subject and object,
the viewer [of a high-concept film] becomes sewn into
the ‘surface’ of the film, contemplating the style of
the narrative and the production. The excess created
through such channels as the production design, stars,
music, and promotional apparati, all of which are so
important to high concept, enhances the appreciation
of the films’ surface qualities. (Wyatt, 1994, p. 60)
But how does high-concept filmmaking reduce risk? On the
surface, the answer seems apparent: high-concept films are less
risky because their stories are simpler and more straightforward,
and the superficial style – be it through the marketing of a star,
the music or even the look of the film – is a quick and easy ‘argu-
ment’ about why moviegoers should see a film. While this may
be partly true, it is merely the first step. In order to understand
the financial appeal of simplicity, we need to historicise the so-
cial relationship between filmmaking and film consumption.
High-concept filmmaking helps increase major filmed enter-
tainment’s degree of confidence because it has become a socially
accepted style of cinema. Not every Hollywood film is high con-
cept, nor is every film of this type wildly popular. Rather, the
general persistence of high-concept films shapes and reinforces
social expectations about what cinema should and should not be.
If the belief that movies should be simple and straightforward
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is strongly held by managers, producers, directors, screenwrit-
ers, actors, artists and consumers, major filmed entertainment
can capitalise, with greater confidence, its expectations about
the future earnings of the high-concept strategy. For example,
Hollywood needs to translate artistic qualities into projections
about consumer behaviour when it searches for projects that
have the potential to become ‘four-quadrant’ films: ‘films ap-
pealing to young and old as well as male and female movie-
goers’ (Elberse, 2013, p. 16). This translation of society-wide
consumer behaviour into financial expectations is less uncertain
when the political-economic foundations of mass culture are re-
inforcing the types of films Hollywood wants to be successful
and disadvantaging filmmakers and audiences that wish that
filmmaking re-discovered the artistic depths of cinema (Adorno,
1997, p. 269).7
Moreover, the wide social acceptance of high-concept cinema
can become self-fulfilling and justify the levels of creative control
in the Hollywood film business. For instance, the Hollywood
star system is commonly used to develop a film project that can
be sold in one or two sentences. The use of well-known stars,
whose fame has come from repeatedly playing certain character
types, gives a film a ‘certain pre-sold identity’ (Wyatt, 1994, p.
24). Thus, major filmed entertainment can use the star system
to guarantee that the film projects will follow through on their
promises. If an advertisement suggests that I keep holding on
to my idea of what a typical Julia Roberts film is, it is also
promising that this particular Julia Roberts film, the one being
advertised, will deliver the goods; it will be what I already expect
7 With respect to the pursuit of alternative narrative styles, for example, Iranian film-
maker Abbas Kiarostami highlights Hollywood’s problematic effects on the way we watch
films: ‘…we want to follow everything or we think the film has failed’ (Baumbach, 2014).
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it to be.
What sort of empirical evidence can we offer in support of our
arguments about risk and high-concept filmmaking? Wyatt uses
US theatrical revenue data to demonstrate that ‘high concept
lowers the risk and uncertainty within the movie marketplace’
(Wyatt, 1994, p. 172). Such an argument supports the claims
of this section, but Wyatt acknowledges that his multi-variable
method is limited. In order to construct a multi-variable regres-
sion, Wyatt treats films as being composites of smaller entities,
whereby each entity is a variable in the production of the film’s
revenues. Variables include: ‘stars, bankable director, merchan-
dising tie-ins, and genre’. Unfortunately, these variables produce
a statistical model that ‘works most successfully with genre-
bound, linear narrative and pre-packaged films – all categories
which overlap with high concept’ (Wyatt, 1994, p. 172).
As an alternative method, we can treat high concept as one
world in a larger cinematic universe. As was established in
Figure 1, US theatrical attendance per capita has remained at
roughly the same level for over 50 years. If we treat this rel-
atively stable moviegoing habit as an outer limit of American
moviegoing, we can ask how much of average movie consump-
tion (∼4–5 films per year) goes to high-concept films. If US
theatrical attendance per capita of high-concept films has in-
creased, we can conclude that these films would be perceived to
possess greater strength in the social context of American the-
atrical exhibition. In other words, the strength of Hollywood’s
key aesthetic style can be an indication of its future longevity in
theatres across the country, especially if there are no foreseeable
changes to the habits of movie consumption.
Figure 5 presents data on US franchise films, a term denoting
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a film that has the copyrights to exploit images, characters, envi-
ronments and stories of intellectual property (e.g. James Bond,
Ghostbusters, Indiana Jones, Jurassic Park, Marvel superheroes
and Harry Potter). The dataset of franchise films is produced
from the list of films that Box Office Mojo, a popular website
for theatrical revenue data, lists in its ‘Franchise Index’. There
are different ways for a film to be considered a franchise film.
A film can be based on intellectual property that originated in
another form of media, such as literature, television shows and
comic books. The production of sequels or ‘spin-offs’ can also
create or extend a film franchise.
Not every high-concept film is a franchise, but all film fran-
chises are high concept. A typical franchise film is reducible to
its marketable element, which is often one or many of its char-
acters. This marketable element is the franchise film’s essence
because the franchise is primarily designed to carry its theatrical
success to or from other channels: television, novels, fast-food
chains, toys and video games (Drake, 2008, p. 77). Additionally,
if a franchise pre-exists its cinematic form, a film version of the
franchise is its own shorthand advertisement, as the essential
idea has been pre-sold to its audience through other media.
Figure 5, Panel A plots the attendance per capita of franchise
films (the dark line is smoothed as a five-year trailing average).
The dotted series is our upper boundary, the total US atten-
dance per capita. We already know that the average American
moviegoer is not seeing more films per year, but we can now
state that more of her ∼4–5 films per year goes to the fran-
chise films that Hollywood distributes. With respect to major
filmed entertainment’s releases, Panel B shows that it is an in-
crease in franchise film production that is pushing franchise films
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Figure 5: Franchise films, 1975–2015: attendance per capita and
number of releases
Notes: All series are 5-year trailing averages. Attendance = total US
gross revenues/average US ticket price.
Sources: www.boxofficemojo.com for yearly gross revenues of individual
films: http://www.boxofficemojo.com/franchises/ for franchise films and
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/genres/chart/?id=foreign.htm for foreign
language; National Association of Theatre Owners for average US ticket price
(http://natoonline.org/data/ticket-price/). Global Insight for total
United States population.
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to higher heights of popularity. Thus, franchise films have also
grown proportionally, as a share of major filmed entertainment’s
total output (Figures 1 and 3).
The strength of consumer dedication to high-concept cinema
can also be analysed indirectly. As film critic Jonathan Rosen-
baum often argues, we have grown comfortable with a Holly-
wood system that works to perpetuate our ignorance of what else
is out there, in the larger universe of cinema (Rosenbaum, 1997,
2000). Thus, to get a better sense of how American cinematic
habits are narrowing, we need to answer another question: what
is the average American not watching? My analysis of theatri-
cal revenue data shows that foreign-language films are not even
in competition for American attendance; they are generally ig-
nored and relegated to a minor league. US attendance per capita
for foreign-language films is so low that only a small proportion
of Americans bother to see even one foreign-language film per
year. Some readers might already know this last fact about
the unpopularity of foreign-language films in America. How-
ever, when examined more closely, low American attendance
for foreign-language films says something important about the
degree of confidence of major filmed entertainment. There have
been four flash increases in American attendance for foreign-
language films – 1998, 2000, 2004 and 2006 – but these short-
term increases were the result of four films that were distributed
by major filmed entertainment’s subsidiaries. The films, dis-
tributors and the corporate parents of the distributors are Life
is Beautiful (1998, Miramax, at the time owned by Disney),
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000, Sony Pictures Classics,
Sony), Hero (2004, Miramax) and Pan’s Labyrinth (2006, Pic-
turehouse, Time Warner). All four films are part of Hollywood’s
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aggressive-but-common strategy to invest and over-inflate the
artistic merits of its pick of films. Life is Beautiful, Crouching
Tiger, Hidden Dragon and Pan’s Labyrinth won awards at the
Golden Globes and the Oscars, and distributors such as Mira-
max and Sony Pictures Classics have been known for stubbornly
preferring foreign-language films that can be easily tailored for
the tastes of North American audiences (McDonald, 2009).
In fact, the attempt to redistribute attendance upwards, to
the widest released films, is negatively affecting Hollywood’s
own branch of artistic cinema, which often competes with many
foreign-language films for awards and status. In the time since
Hero and Pan’s Labyrinth, major filmed entertainment has closed
some of its independent, more artistically minded cinema divi-
sions (Ortner, 2013). Furthermore, the budget range of $20
million to $85 million has become in Hollywood, according to
director Steven Soderbergh, a ‘dead zone’. It is possible for an
art film to find financing below $20 million – although even that
might be too generous – but a budget above $85 million is not
even a conceivable possibility. ‘Above the 85 range you’re into
sort of the physically big movies that probably have movie stars
in them or have some high concept behind them that they can
sell’ (Soderbergh, 2010, p. 62, emphasis mine).
Figure 6 focuses on a dimension of Hollywood’s change to
artistic output by plotting the attendance of the winner and
nominees for the Academy Award for Best Picture. The line
series is a three-year moving average of the attendance for Best
Picture winners and the box plots show the spread of atten-
dance for the nominees in set intervals (1980–9, 1990–9, 2000–8,
2009–15). Since the win of Titanic in 1997, there has been a
steady decline in theatrical attendance for films that won an
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Oscar for best picture. Interestingly, this decline might explain
why in 2009 the Academy increased the number of films to be
nominated per year, from five to nine. From 1970 to 2009, the
winner was always above the 50th percentile of Best Picture
attendance, while the nominees would create a spread between
popular films (over 50 million in attendance) to films that got
much less (less than 5 million). In the years from 2009 to 2015,
the spread of nominees is similar but much wider, and the ad-
dition of more nominees is now being used to counter-balance
the significant decline in attendance for the winners, which are
now below the 50th percentile in Best Picture attendance. For
example, the attendances for such nominees as Avatar, Up, In-
ception, Toy Story 3, American Sniper, Gravity and The Blind
Side are all at least five times larger than the attendances of such
winners as 12 Years a Slave, The Artist, Spotlight and Birdman
or (The Unexpected Virtue of Ignorance).
Increasing the Degree of Confidence in Satu-
ration Booking
The sector-wide institution of saturation booking has modified
major filmed entertainment’s orientation to risk and the social
world of cinema. In other words, even if major filmed entertain-
ment has always sought to control the creation and consumption
of films for pecuniary ends, the nature of the saturation-booking
strategy compelled Hollywood to add another consideration to
its predictions about the expected earnings of a film. Satu-
ration booking is not applied to every film. The Hollywood
film business must now decide, on the basis of what it thinks
will be popular, which films will be given wide theatrical re-
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leases. The tiered exhibition system of classical Hollywood may
be no more, but some contemporary films will only ever get
‘platform’ releases, which means they will open in a small num-
ber of theatres, usually in select cities (New York, Los Angeles,
etc.). Moreover, not every cinematic premise or idea is deemed
suitable for the saturation-booking strategy. The widest releases
are Hollywood’s biggest, most expensive blockbusters, and often
they are also good examples of high concept’s influence.
Figure 6: Academy award for best picture: theatrical attendance
Sources: www.boxofficemojo.com for yearly gross revenues of individual
films; National Association of Theatre Owners for average US ticket price
(http://natoonline.org/data/ticket-price/).
Overall, a confident decision about a distribution strategy is
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a confident judgment about how a film will rank relative to its
cohorts. In an article for Review of Capital as Power, I used
opening theatres as a proxy for future expectations (McMahon,
2013). Opening theatres stand as a proxy for future expecta-
tions because the decision about the number of opening theatres
is made before a stream of boxoffice revenues actually begins to
flow. Decisions about what is a good release strategy for each
film derive from financial expectations about what will happen
to each film on its opening weekend and onwards. Now, the key
point to our examination of risk is that not every high-grossing
film is the product of a wide-release strategy. A platform release
can, over time, become popular and consequently earn a rela-
tively high level of gross revenues. For example, Schindler’s List,
which opened in only 25 theatres, ended up the ninth-highest
grossing film of 1993. But major filmed entertainment does not
want to wait for its wide releases to eventually become popular;
it wants to hit the iron when it is hot. It wants to open a select
number of films in a large number of theatres – often more than
3,000 – and to gross as much income as it can and sooner rather
than later. This strategy, though, requires major film entertain-
ment to be very confident in its particular choices (McMahon,
2013).
When sorted from largest to smallest, opening-theatres data
can be used as a proxy for the future expectations about the fi-
nancial performances of the widest released films per year. Fig-
ure 7 uses this assumption to analyse the dependence of revenue
rank on theatre rank. For each year from 1982 to 2014, films
are sorted and ranked by opening theatre size, where the largest
opening is first and so on. Each film is given a rank for its po-
sition in opening theatre data for its year and for its position in
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yearly gross revenues. If, for instance, a film had a theatre rank
of 1 and a revenue rank of 6, the film would be the first largest
opening of its year and would have achieved the sixth largest
gross revenues.
Figure 7: Revenue rank versus opening theatre rank, US market
Sources: www.boxofficemojo.com for yearly gross revenues and opening
theatre sizes of individual films.
Even if a few wide-release films still do poorly, confidence
about the wide-release strategy comes from greater predictabil-
ity overall, whereby the largest openings will, in general, become
the highest ranked films. Panels A, B and C of Figure 7 show
that major filmed entertainment has had a boost in its confi-
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dence about saturation booking. Each of these panels looks at
a span of 11 years and plots the hundred widest releases against
their revenue rankings. In the most recent period, Panel C,
the relationship is tightest; this would translate into higher con-
fidence that the widest releases will become the biggest hits.
Panel D plots the r-squared value of the correlation by year. As
it shows, the correlation between theatre rank and revenue rank
has been rising steadily.
Figure 7 corroborates some of the research of Elbrese, who
also concludes that opening theatres data can show that there
is an increasing success to the blockbuster strategy (Elberse,
2013). Yet I differ in my political-economic interpretation of
why opening theatres is a good predictor of theatrical revenues.
Elbrese consistently uses gambling metaphors in her writing on
the business of blockbusters because her starting assumptions,
intentional or not, do not include the broader political- eco-
nomic power of the firms involved. But expensive, big-budget
films do not simply succeed or fail on their own feet, which is a
connotation of Elbrese’s assumptions that blockbusters are risky
and that executives make high-stake bets (2013). Rather, ma-
jor filmed entertainment uses its institutional power to shape
the cultural environment that is being capitalised. For exam-
ple, I argue elsewhere (McMahon, 2015) that Hollywood has,
from 1997 to 2013, shortened the theatrical release window in
two ways: the average number of days a film is in theatres
and the average number of days before a film is released in a
video format (DVD, Blu-ray, streaming). This shortening does
not affect all films equally. The widest releases are given lots
of promotion and advertising to earn huge revenues in a nar-
rower window, while ‘platform’ releases are forced to generate
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heat through ‘word-of-mouth’ consumer reviews, but with only
a small number of opening theatres and minimal promotional
spending. Moreover, blockbusters can successfully accumulate
large revenues before the point when negative word-of-mouth
has spread too far and becomes a potential source of risk (Cucco,
2009; De Vany, 2004).
In addition to the historical changes in theatrical window
size, there is rising inequality in both the distribution of the-
atrical revenues and opening theatre size. Figure 8 plots the
yearly Gini coefficient, a common measure of inequality, of the-
atrical revenues and opening theatres from 1983 to 2015. Panel
A covers all films released in the United States. It demonstrates
that the rising inequality of theatrical revenues is positively cor-
related with the rising inequality in the distribution of opening
theatres between films. This correlation between two forms of
rising inequality in theatrical exhibition is directly related to
Hollywood’s objective of risk reduction. The rises in inequality
occur in a similar fashion and at the same time as the time series
in Figure 7, Panel D, which indicates there has been a steady in-
crease in the chance for the widest releases to end up also being
the largest in terms of gross revenues. Figure 8, Panel B looks
at inequality above the 70th percentile of each year, ranked by
opening theatre size. Interestingly, Panel B shows a change in
the early 2000s, around the time when franchise cinema boomed
(Figure 5). Before the 2000s, there was virtually no inequality
in the theatre distribution of the widest releases (a Gini coeffi-
cient of 0 is perfect equality). Since the 2000s, however, major
filmed entertainment is even treating its biggest projects differ-
ently; some are getting even more opening theatres and this is
translating into a greater annual share of theatrical revenues.
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Figure 8: Revenue rank versus opening theatre rank, US market
Sources: www.boxofficemojo.com for yearly gross revenues and opening
theatre sizes of individual films.
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Figure 9 demonstrates that the historical transformation of
major filmed entertainment’s distribution strategies registers as
a reduction in risk, both absolutely and differentially, relative
to dominant capital (δ˙a < δ˙b). Volatility per firm is constructed
in two steps. First, for each year, I compute the per cent rate of
change of operating income from its five-year trailing average.
This smoothing prevents two outlier rates of changes, 1963 and
1984 (Panel C), from skewing the measures of standard devia-
tion, which are meant to measure how approximately two-thirds
of the values deviate from the average. The series in Panels A
and B are rolling 20-year standard deviations of the computed
rates of change. A larger standard deviation is an indicator of
greater volatility in the earning growth rates of the previous 20
years. Thus, Figure 9 demonstrates that major filmed entertain-
ment’s volatility has been shrinking since the late 1970s, and in
such a way that is coeval with historical changes that have been
plotted in other figures. In particular, the shapes of the series in
Panels A and B resemble the shapes of the series that measured
attendance volatility for the top three and top five films per year
(see Figure 4). The long-term decline in volatility is also coeval
with the long-term increase in the correlation between opening
theatre rank and theatrical revenues rank (see Figure 7).
Conclusion
This paper uses the capital-as-power approach to investigate the
political-economic reasons behind contemporary Hollywood’s aes-
thetic output. It is important that we understand these political-
economic reasons better. A more qualitative, cultural analysis of
Hollywood cinema is better suited to analyse the small details of
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form, style, genre, content and ideology (Bordwell, 2006; Ryan &
Kellner, 1988), but political economic research can build connec-
tions between Hollywood’s aesthetic behaviour, its institutional
power and its capitalist goals. These connections are needed
to construct a multi-sided perspective of Hollywood, mass cul-
ture and society. These connections also allow for non-aesthetic
reasons to be included in explanations of why some filmmaking
styles are rarely deviated from, why some cinematic styles and
ideas continue to be unrealised potentials, and why some films
appear to be unfailing at the box office, almost as if these types
of films are ‘naturally’ popular. In particular, this paper shows
why a critical political-economic method is a welcome comple-
ment to research on Hollywood cinema. Contemporaneous to
the rise and entrenchment of blockbuster cinema, with all of
its qualitative elements, is a period of differential risk reduction
from 1980 to 2015. Achieving this risk reduction suggests, from
a capital-as-power approach, that major filmed entertainment
grew to acquire a higher degree of confidence in the capital-
isation of cinema, which is discounting future expectations to
present prices.
Moving forward, this analysis of major filmed entertainment
is a stepping-stone to analyse the broader political-economic as-
pects of contemporary Hollywood cinema. One of these aspects
is the effect of reduced risk in ‘filmed entertainment’ on the cap-
ital accumulation of conglomerated media. Just as importantly,
this paper can complement other political-economic theories of
Hollywood that seek to understand to how and to what extent
large studios possess ‘distributional power’ (Babe, 2009; Hozic,
2001; Kunz, 2007; Leaver, 2010). The capital-as-power approach
provides a method to analyse how this ‘distributional power’ has
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Figure 9: Major filmed entertainment’s degree of confidence:
differential volatility
Sources: COMPUSTAT through WRDS for operating income of Major
Filmed Entertainment, 1950–92. COMPUSTAT through WRDS for operating
income of Dominant Capital, 1950–2015. Annual reports of Disney, News Corp,
Viacom, Sony, Time Warner (Management’s Discussion of Business Operations
for information on their filmed entertainment interests) for operating income of
Major Filmed Entertainment, 1993–2015.
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expressed itself in the capitalisation of Hollywood cinema: we
can now identify, more precisely, how risk reduction was the
way for Hollywood to increase its differential power in the con-
temporary period.
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